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Ethical Pluralism from a Classical
Liberal Perspective
Chandran Kukathas
In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state,
seek to curtail the liberty of judgement which they are unable to
tyrannize over.
—Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Is the ideal society one that embodies or aims for ethical uniformity, or
one that emphasizes instead the accommodation of ethical pluralism?
From a classical liberal perspective the answer can only be that ethical
pluralism should be accommodated.
But here some caveats are in order. First, such a society would be
“ideal” only in a limited sense: in the sense that it is the best kind of
society to try to sustain given ethical disagreement—even though it would
be a better society if it were governed by the right ethical values. The
classical liberal perspective assumes that a society that embodies ethical
uniformity can only be a society in which uniformity is coerced; and that
a society that aims for ethical uniformity must either resort to coercion
or fail to attain uniformity (or, more likely still, both). Humans tend to
disagree, and the larger the society the greater the likelihood of substantial
disagreement. As Hume observed, “such is the nature of the human mind
that it always lays hold on every mind that approaches it; and as it is
wonderfully fortiﬁed by an unanimity of sentiments, so is it shocked and
disturbed by any contrariety. Hence [our] impatience of opposition, even
in the most speculative and indifferent opinions.”1 Ethical pluralism is
ideal because of these constrained circumstances and because coercion is
undesirable.
Second, even though it is necessary to offer a straightforward answer
to the question of the classical liberal response to ethical pluralism, and
to the subsidiary question of the extent to which ethical pluralism is
acceptable, within the classical liberal tradition there is a measure of di-
versity—indeed, of ethical pluralism—regarding this very issue. There is
a considerable disagreement within that tradition over the extent to which
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diversity should be accommodated; over the principles by which such is-
sues should be decided; and, indeed, over the question of what is classical
liberalism2 and who are its exponents.3
Third, in view of the fact that the classical liberalism in question is a
tradition, it is worth noting that the classical liberal pantheon of heroes is
equally contested. For some it is very much a modern European tradition,
whereas others see traces of classical liberal thought not only in ancient
and medieval ideas but also in the writings of Confucius and Laozi.4 And
many of the heroes of classical liberalism are also claimed by other politi-
cal traditions: by republicans, conservatives, socialists, democrats, and
egalitarian liberals.5 Equally, classical liberals disagree among themselves
over rights of membership in the club: some consider Burke a conserva-
tive, others ﬁnd Hume too skeptical, and to a few Mill is an apostate who
must be forever barred.
The point of these caveats is to make clear that any account of classical
liberalism and its injunctions is bound to be contestable to a considerable
degree. It is not possible to offer an account of the classical liberal tradi-
tion without offering, in effect, a particular theory within it—one that, in
the end, takes sides on issues that are, to varying degrees, in dispute. In-
deed, there are some issues on which there is no settled position not be-
cause there are competing views but because the tradition is itself evolv-
ing. On such matters as the status of women, and human sexuality, and
over issues arising out of medical treatment, health, and mortality, classi-
cal liberal thinking is evolving in response to developments in technology
as well as to changes in society more generally.
The account offered here, then, is as much a particular theory as it is a
summary of “the classical liberal position.” While it might be expected
to be viewed critically (or with disdain) by other ethical traditions, it will
surely also be questioned within classical liberalism. It will certainly be
questioned by egalitarian liberals, many of whom view themselves as heirs
of the classical liberal tradition. Nonetheless, this essay offers one view
of what classical liberalism amounts to, leaving the demarcation disputes
and issues of inheritance to be settled by the reader.
Putting these qualiﬁcations to one side, then, what is classical liberal-
ism, and by what principles does it determine the limits of ethical plural-
ism? Clearly, classical liberalism will have to be distinguished from other
forms of liberalism—notably egalitarian liberalism. But the ﬁrst point that
has to be made about classical liberalism is that it is a political philosophy
rather than an ethical doctrine. In this respect it differs from religious
traditions such as Christianity and Confucianism, and from the natural
law tradition. Classical liberalism does not purport to answer a range
of important questions about the nature of the human good, or about
humanity’s place in creation, or about the forms that are most appropriate
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in relations among people. Neither does it offer any vision or promise of
human liberation, as do various kinds of feminism and critical theory; or,
for that matter, any theory of social justice, as does liberal egalitarianism.
Although its proponents ﬁnd its moral commitments compelling, it is, for
all that, an austere and somewhat prosaic dogma.
As a tradition of political philosophy, then, classical liberalism has two
strands or dimensions: social theory and moral theory. Social theory here
refers to that dimension of classical liberal thinking which concerns itself
with accounting for the nature of human society. Many of the most im-
portant ﬁgures in classical liberal thought devoted considerable effort to
the understanding of society because they were as much interested in the
question of what kinds of human arrangements were feasible as they were
in the question of what arrangements might be desirable. Indeed, some,
like Montesquieu, argued that a wise legislator looking to govern well
would look carefully at the society his laws would shape, for its nature
would bear decisively on his prospects of success. Society had a life of its
own and could not be designed and shaped at will. It was already gov-
erned by economic, historical, and moral forces that demanded investiga-
tion (and which were capable of being understood). From the beginning
classical liberals were thus not only philosophers but also economists,
historians, and sociologists, as well as moralists.6
Although it would be foolish to try to reduce the social theories of
these various ﬁgures to a single, unambiguous, doctrine, they share a
number of important convictions. First, and most generally, they agree
that order is possible without design. Society is a self-ordering or self-
regulating structure that is not the product of deliberate construction.
Order is certainly not the product of government; rather, order, in Tom
Paine’s words, “has its origin in the principles of society and the natural
constitution of man. It existed prior to government, and would exist if
the formality of government was abolished. The mutual dependence and
reciprocal interest which man has upon man, and all the parts of a civi-
lized community upon each other, create that great chain of connection
which holds it together.”7
In this view, government is necessary to deal with problems or tasks
that cannot so readily be addressed through spontaneous cooperation.
The precise tasks that are appropriate for government have always been
a matter on which classical liberals have held a range of views. While
writers like Paine saw little that society could not accomplish itself, oth-
ers, like Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek, thought there was an important
case for government activity to provide not only national defense but also
programs for the general welfare. What was not disputed, however, was
that society was a self-regulating structure whose tendency was to order,
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and which could not be shaped or directed by the impatient legislator or
what Smith called “the man of system.”
This last point is important not so much because this thinking marked
a sharp departure from earlier social theory as because it stood in sharp
contrast to the coming challenge of modern socialism. Particularly in its
Marxian variant, socialist thought focused on the wasteful competitive-
ness of modern market or commercial societies and looked to centralized,
collective planning to overcome the evils such societies were thought to
produce: notably, poverty and alienation. Classical liberalism was, and
remains, resistant to the idea that such a means can ever be available to
redesign or reshape society that it might accord with this, or any, precon-
ceived ideal.
This leads to the second important feature of classical liberal social
theory: it includes within it a wariness of and skepticism about govern-
mental power, and political power more generally. While individuals in
society act from a variety of motives and with a variety of purposes, in
politics, as David Hume observed, they must be presumed to act like
knaves. Indeed, they must be understood as agents with ambitions that
often lead them to act in concert with others—in factions—to serve their
particular (rather than general) interests. For this reason, sound political
institutions were ones that divided and separated power. Concentrations
of power were dangerous to liberty and also dangerous for the stability
of regimes.
Third, and most generally, classical liberalism stands in contrast to
those social doctrines which have looked at the diversity of human reli-
gious and moral commitments and wondered how they might be brought
into closer harmony, into a closer social unity. For some, an organic—
almost spiritual—unity, in which the interests of society would be brought
into harmony with the interests of the individual, was the highest ideal
for which to strive. For classical liberalism, on the other hand, the assump-
tion has always been that such a unity is impossible, if not altogether
undesirable, because society is by its nature pluralistic, and individuals
are prone to disagreement and conﬂict. The social problem was not how
to bring about unity and cultural, or religious, or moral harmony, but
how to preserve an order within which conﬂict was kept in check, and
the plurality of ways allowed to coexist, if not ﬂourish.
It is worth noting here that some classical liberals, such as Lord Acton,
argued explicitly and vigorously that diversity was not simply desirable
in itself but also essential if liberty was to be preserved. In his treatment
of the issue of nationalities, he argued against John Stuart Mill who, in
Considerations of Representative Government, presented a defense of
nationalism as a new phase in the progress of freedom and had also
averred that freedom required that the boundaries of the state should
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coincide with those of nationalities. For Acton, however, this was a pro-
found error. Far from being likely to preserve free institutions, such a
condition would jeopardize liberty. A state marked by homogeneity
would also turn out to be one whose power was most difﬁcult to limit.
A state of a diversity of peoples, however, contained an important check
on that power in the form of associations independent of central power.
“Liberty provokes diversity, and diversity preserves liberty by supplying
the means of organisation.”8
For Acton, the theory of nationality represented not progress but a
retrograde step in the history of liberty. “If we take the establishment of
liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society,
we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect
which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct
nationalities, without oppressing them.” Indeed, he argued that those
states with no mixture of races were imperfect, whereas those in which
the effects of that mixture had disappeared were decrepit. And the state
that “is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself,” and one
that “labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own
vitality.”9
Saying this put Acton squarely within the classical liberal tradition. His
contention here is a variant of James Madison’s claim that the liberty of
the extended republic rested, in good measure, on the plurality of interests
that lay within it. Diversity might bring with it problems of destabilizing
social conﬂict; but it also offered the very resource most needed to address
social instability: the pluralism that made difﬁcult the rise of irresistible
power.This is why federalism has also been an important strand of classi-
cal liberal argument. If it is important that power be dispersed rather than
concentrated, a federal structure offers one way of weakening the hold of
central authority on society—by devolving power to provincial authori-
ties. The basis of this is not an attachment to states’ rights, or to any form
of group rights, but simply the recognition of the importance of having in
place institutions that will resist or impede the concentration of power.10
Indeed, federalism is an important way of resisting the power of the ma-
jority, which is all too likely to tyrannize over the minority if unchecked.
In any decision-making process, the majority will have its way at any
particular step. Checking majority power can only be accomplished by
institutions that do not enable the same majority to be decisive on all
occasions. Federalism accomplishes this, at least to some degree, by creat-
ing multiple majorities. Power is concentrated when majorities collude,
and dispersed when they collide.
In this social theory can already be detected the commitments that make
up the second strand or dimension of classical liberalism: its moral theory.
Here, however, it must be borne in mind that this liberalism is a political
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rather than an ethical doctrine. It rests on a moral theory but with respect
to one dimension of moral life: the political. It does not offer an account
of what kinds of life are valuable or what morality should govern all our
relations. Indeed, it takes as its starting point the fact of ethical pluralism.
In classical liberal moral theory two commitments are preeminent and
also importantly related—the ﬁrst to liberty and the second to the convic-
tion that the liberty in question is the liberty of individuals. Classical liber-
alism is, broadly speaking, libertarian and individualist.
Within this tradition, it must be acknowledged, the proper understand-
ing of liberty is a matter of some dispute. Conceptions of liberty vary,
with some falling into Berlin’s category of negative liberty, and others into
the category of positive liberty.11 And the justiﬁcation of liberty has also
varied, with some appealing to natural right, others to utility, and some
to perfectionist12 doctrines of the good life. For some, freedom is secured
if individuals are merely unimpeded; for others, freedom means auton-
omy or self-direction. But however differently freedom has been con-
strued philosophically, the concerns of classical liberals have been more
plain: to argue that individuals ought to enjoy some liberty so that they
might live by their own religious beliefs, and not be subject to arbitrary
power. States should not deprive people of freedom—or of their property
without their consent (or without just compensation). Liberty of con-
science ought to be respected, along with freedom of association. In gen-
eral there should be a presumption in favor of toleration of differences.
Within classical liberalism, toleration holds an especially important
place, although there are surprisingly few substantial treatments of the
idea by the great ﬁgures in the tradition. It is defended implicitly by J. S.
Mill (in his defense of freedom of thought and discussion), explicitly but
brieﬂy by Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise, and vigorously by
Locke in a series of letters concerning toleration; however, the most pow-
erful and comprehensive defence remains that offered by Pierre Bayle in
his Philosophical Commentary (1686).13 The roots of the liberal theory
of toleration lie in arguments offered by these thinkers (and by others
such as Bodin, Althusius, and Milton) for religious tolerance. But it ought
to be noted that the status of toleration within liberalism is philosophi-
cally problematic. If liberalism is indeed a political doctrine that maintains
that ethical disagreements must be put aside, along with questions about
the nature of the human good, then toleration has a fundamental place
in liberalism. Liberalism becomes, in effect, a doctrine of toleration. If,
however, liberalism were to be regarded as a doctrine with particular sub-
stantive commitments—say, to the promotion or upholding of individual
autonomy—then toleration would become much less important.14
Tempting though it is to say that a commitment to toleration is central
to classical liberalism, whereas in other versions of liberalism (notably
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egalitarian liberalism) toleration is subordinated to other, substantive,
commitments, such a view would be difﬁcult to sustain historically. Too
many classical liberal thinkers have revealed to us important, substantive,
convictions guiding their thought. Nonetheless, if there is a philosophical
distinction to be drawn between classical and egalitarian liberalism, it is
surely here. Classical liberalism is committed to a toleration of difference
or diversity, which makes substantive equality an implausible goal. Equal-
ity can only be pursued if diversity is brought under control so that there
is at least one common dimension to social life, and so one common sub-
ject of value—which might then be equalized. But in a regime of diversity
there will not be sufﬁcient agreement to make this possible. Toleration
wouldmake for a regime in which different traditions coexisted, including
different traditions of social justice. What makes a regime a liberal one is
not its commitment to equality but its toleration of dissent. The greater
its capacity to tolerate dissenting views or traditions or ways of life, in-
cluding nonliberal ones, the more liberal the regime.
This does, however, raise the important question of the place of “equal-
ity” in classical liberal thinking. After all, classical liberal thinkers such
as F. A. Hayek have maintained that equality is a notion that is central to
the liberal standpoint: “The great aim of the struggle for liberty has been
equality before the law.”15 Yet the equality to which classical liberalism is
committed is only equality before the law. No individual or category of
persons is to be regarded as above the law; nor is anyone without the
right to the protection that the law affords. The basis for this attitude is
the commitment to liberty: taking liberty seriously means not denying it
to anyone. It does not, however, mean a commitment to making people
more equal in any respect; nor does it mean assuming that they are equal.
On the contrary, the classical liberal view rests on the assumption that
individuals are different (and, so, unequal in all sorts of ways), but main-
tains that these differences provide no grounds for treating them differ-
ently.16 Much of this, of course, classical liberalism shares with egalitarian
liberalism; but the two traditions differ inasmuch as the latter evinces a
positive concern to secure a substantive equality of persons—whether that
be an equality of income, or wealth, or welfare, or resources, or capabili-
ties, to name just a few of the important egalitarian ideals. Classical liber-
alism is not interested in substantive equality.
Equality ﬁgures in classical liberal thinking, then, only insofar as formal
equality is implicit in the liberal commitment to liberty. But one other
implication also needs to be recognized. Classical liberalism upholds the
liberty of people as individuals. What this means, however, needs fuller
explication. It would not be true to suggest that individuals are all that
exist in society, for society is made up not only of individuals but also
of other sorts of entities, from collectivities such as crowds to agents or
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institutions such as corporations. All of these have not only their own
places in society and social life but also, to varying degrees, interests of
their own. Liberalism is not committed in any way to denying the exis-
tence of such entities, nor to asserting that individuals are all that are to
be found in society. Liberalism is committed, however, to the view that it
is the interests only of individuals that matter. Even though groups or
institutions may have interests, they do not matter—except insofar as the
fates of such entities may bear on the interests of individuals (both those
within and those beyond those groups or institutions).
In summary, then, the principles of classical liberalism suggest that the
good society is one in which individuals are free to pursue their own
ends—and ends, here, are no more than desires—in concert with others
or alone. In such a society, the purpose of law, and authority, is to make
possible a peaceful coexistence among human beings who will, inevitably,
exercise their freedom to live differently and ﬁnd themselves in conﬂict
with others who might covet the same goods, or seek to take an interest
in the beliefs and activities of their fellows. The function of law and gov-
ernment is to adjudicate—to act as umpire in—any disputes that might
arise; but not to direct any to better or more popular ends.17 In this society,
the capacity of any authority to amass the power to push society in a
particular direction would be constrained by a division and separation of
powers. To put it in another way, the model of sovereignty that describes
such a society would a Humean rather than a Hobbesian one: sovereign
power would not rest in the hands of a single person or body but be
dispersed into the hands of different authorities. In such a society there is
no ultimate authority but numerous authorities, each superior to some
and subordinate to others.
The centrality of the metaphor of the umpire to the classical liberal
outlook is worth noting. An umpire is someone to whom players turn
when there is a dispute. That dispute may be over the application of a
rule, or the interpretation of a rule, or the question of whether a rule
exists at all. But it is not the existence of the rules or the fact that there is
a game that is critical for understanding this metaphor. What is important
about the umpire is that he is a third party to whom the disputants turn
for a ruling—and a ruling that is authoritative. The umpire’s ruling is
decisive not because the umpire is smarter, or better informed, or more
just but because he is authorized (either tacitly or explicitly) to make it.
He is taken to be, in principle, both an uninterested party and a disinter-
ested one. (If he is taken to have an interest in the outcome of his decision,
or to be partial to one of the disputants, his authority is likely to wither,
as one or more of the disputants cease to regard his rulings as authorita-
tive.) In the context of society, the umpire or ruler adjudicates disputes
over justice. Because people hold to different views about justice, and
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endorse different standards of social justice, ruling authorities settle mat-
ters by determining what standard(s) should prevail.
On this understanding there is nothing about the nature of the state as
umpire that makes it uniquely capable of discovering or determining what
is indeed just. But the point of the state is not to create a just social order—
its purpose is not the establishment of social justice. The purpose of the
state is to preserve order by averting conﬂict so that people might live
freely; and it does this by exercising its authority to resolve conﬂict among
beings who cannot help but disagree with one another. This understand-
ing of the state stands in contrast to that of egalitarian liberalism, which
views the state as having a larger purpose: to create and uphold a socially
just political order.
SOCIAL REGULATION
The question now is, should the power of the state ever be invoked to
protect, ban, or otherwise regulate ethically based differences—and, if so,
where and how? Most societies exhibit such differences to some degree
or another, to the extent that they contain individuals who belong to dif-
ferent religious or cultural traditions, or hold to different moral and politi-
cal principles. In modern societies such differences are given expression
in disagreements over many things, from the defensibility of particular
customs, to the duties of parents to their children, to the permissibility of
pornography, to the right of some political parties to participate in the
political process. Does the state have some role to play here in addressing
these differences of opinion or outlook?
In the simplest terms, the answer is: yes, the state cannot help but have
a role to play. But to understand why this is so, and to go on to see the
proper nature and extent of this role, it is necessary to gain a better ap-
preciation of the nature of the state in classical liberalism. The best classi-
cal liberal statement of the purpose or point of the state is offered by
Spinoza, who writes in his Theologico-Political Treatise: “the ultimate
aim of government is not to rule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedi-
ence, but contrariwise, to free every man from fear, that he may live in all
possible security; in other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist
and work without injury to himself or others . . . the object of government
is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets. . . . In
fact, the true aim of government is liberty.”18 In other words, the purpose
of the state is to provide that security which would not be available to
people in the absence of the order made real by the exercise of the author-
ity of the state. That security is the security that enables people to pursue
their goals or ends in safety—without fear. And that security is the security
that is consonant with liberty.
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If this is the point of the state, the basis of or justiﬁcation for any action
it takes to regulate differences in society rests on the necessity for it to act
to preserve the ongoing order of such a society. The state may—for it
must—act to preserve the safety and security of its citizens; and to prevent
the disintegration of the state into lawlessness or civil war. And if the state
is understood as an umpire, it is also responsible for determining when
the society is in danger, and what action ought to be taken. It has to decide
when and what action has to be taken to protect a person or group, or
ban a practice, or regulate a form of behavior.
But because the purpose of the state is liberty, it is also the case that it
has no cause to protect or ban or regulate for any other purpose. It is not
for the state to regulate to improve society: to make it healthier, or more
noble, or more equal, or simply right-thinking. It is not for the state to
ensure that some ways of life survive or that others die out; that some are
saved or others damned; that one tradition prevail or another sink into
oblivion. Indeed, the state has to recognize that human desires or pur-
poses are innumerable, and that even traditions of thought about what
are the proper ends humans ought to pursue are numerous and varied.
The point of the state is not to settle what disagreements there might
be among these different ways of thinking but to preserve an order in
which such disagreement does not lead into disorder. To put it another
way, the point of the state is to preserve an order in which the exercise of
liberty does not lead to disorder—which is to say that the point is to
preserve liberty.
By this understanding of the nature and function of the state, the state
should regulate, when necessary, so as to preserve an order in which differ-
ent traditions or practices can continue to operate. It should regulate to
preserve an order of toleration rather than to reshape society according
to the lights of any one particular tradition—including the majority tradi-
tion. This means that, to the extent that it should regulate, it should regu-
late to make possible, rather than to stiﬂe, dissent from the majority view.
In practical terms, this means regulating, when necessary, to ensure that
those who adhere to different ethical beliefs are free to try to live by those
beliefs, even if they run counter to the attitudes of other groups or tradi-
tions. For a free society will be one in which those who dissent are not
forced to assimilate into the tradition of the dominant majority but are
able to ﬁnd niches for themselves—spaces within which they might live
differently.
To the extent that dissenting practices differ only trivially from the ways
of the mainstream of society, of course, the problem dissent poses is also
trivial (though, like the Lilliputians, humans are more than capable of
turning trivial differences into occasions for violent conﬂict). But ac-
cording to the classical liberal view, the freedom to practice dissent should
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also be upheld even when differences are substantial. It should even be
upheld for those who dissent from the principles of classical liberalism—
and, so, from the principle of toleration of dissent.
Given that the state cannot but be involved in social regulation—since
even to do nothing is to sanction some kinds of activity that may be con-
troversial—the question is, How should the principle of toleration be
given practical expression? This question is better addressed through
some concrete issues rather than in the abstract, so it may be worth con-
sidering social regulation of some particular ethically based disagree-
ments. Two topics might usefully be addressed: sexuality and life-and-
death decisions.
Human Sexuality
Human sexual practices, and attitudes toward them, have been as change-
able as they are diverse. And from the earliest times to the modern day
societies have sought to regulate, as well as to regularize, sexual conduct.
The description and evaluation of sexual behavior has undoubtedly been
the subject of contention; but it has also been the object of legal sanction.
The legal regulation of sexuality addresses a range of issues, from the
permissibility of marriage (e.g., in same-sex unions); to the acceptable age
of consent to sexual activity; to the allowability of some forms of sexual
relationships (such as homosexuality) or sexual conduct (such as sod-
omy). Yet while the legal regulation of sexuality may appear, on the face
of it, to be essentially a formalizing of sanctions reﬂecting established
public attitudes, it needs to be recognized that the law is also implicated
in a larger story about the cultural construction of identity, and sexual
identity in particular.19
Given the history of disputation about sexual conduct and sexual iden-
tity, what is the attitude of classical liberalism to the handling of ethically
based disagreements in this area? The ﬁrst point that has to be made is
that, because classical liberalism suggests that individuals should be left
free to pursue their own purposes, and that differences should be toler-
ated, it also advocates a principled tolerance of different attitudes toward
sexuality and different traditions of marriage. In its terms, a society is a
liberal social order if it is one which will tolerate differences of attitude
and practice within that order. Indeed, the state has no principled interest
in matters of marriage or sexuality. It is not part of its purpose to sanction
one form of marriage or another, or to promote any form or understand-
ing of sexuality as more appropriate (or, for that matter, to deﬁne any
forms as deviant).
Two problems that ﬂow from this stance, however, need to be ad-
dressed. The ﬁrst is that it is not possible to ignore the fact that the modern
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state is already implicated in the regulation of these matters, and in ways
that make it almost impossible for it to withdraw. The existence of welfare
beneﬁts, or tax concessions, which vary according to marital status, for
example, means that the deﬁnition of marriage is already a state interest.
Short of reforming—or reconstructing—the entire ediﬁce of political soci-
ety, what should be done? Classical liberalism’s answer to the question of
social regulation needs to be offered in this context. The second problem
is that, even while the state is to be discouraged from pronouncing on
marriage and sexuality, the reality is that not only the state as central
authority is responsible for regulation on such matters. Within many, if
not most, states a number of different jurisdictions may have chosen to
regulate differently. Thus, for example, laws about sexual conduct, mar-
riage, and divorce vary from state to state in the United States, as they do
in different states in Australia. How these differences should be addressed
is also an issue for classical liberalism.
A part of what must be said in response to the ﬁrst problem is that the
state has to regulate, when it must, in ways that avoid presuming the
correctness of one ethical stance as against another onmatters of marriage
and sexuality. But the reality is that this is possible only to a limited extent
when the state acts as more than merely an umpire but becomes involved
in substantive enterprises: assisting families (and upholding or promoting
“the family”); improving community (or “national”) health standards; or
providing a system of education. To the extent that the state is implicated
or involved in such enterprises, it will not be able to avoid adopting sub-
stantive ethical positions. It will have to say what does not count as a
family; what kinds of conduct are not consistent with safe sexual life-
styles; and what it is appropriate for children to be taught about sexuality
and sexual conduct. In liberal societies this creates a problem because the
stance of ethical neutrality cannot plausibly be regarded as anything but a
substantive position by those whose ethical perspectives differ. Taxpayers
whose idea of the family envisages only husband and wife, and their chil-
dren, may not condone public deﬁnitions that include same-sex, polyga-
mous, or incestuous relationships.
To the extent that it is possible, however, the classical liberal reaction
to ethical differences here would be to say that a good society would be
one that left people with different ethical views the opportunity to dis-
tance themselves from the ethical position of the state—to disengage from
“mainstream” society. Thus, in such a society, even if the state exercises
its interest in deﬁning marriage to advance its own purposes, there will
be the freedom for those who dissent from this ethical view to live by their
own, alternative standards or deﬁnitions. There will be an opportunity for
dissenters to exit, and to reconstruct communities of their own. For those,
for example, who wish to live in same-sex unions, there would be the
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 23 Oct 2019 06:29:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kukathas ✥ 67
opportunity not so much to have such unions recognized as a form of
marriage as to reject the salience or necessity of such recognition alto-
gether. In the free society according to classical liberalism, the dissenters
are free to leave, even if acceptance or recognition of their dissenting
stance(s) is not possible.
There is, however, a troubling aspect to this position, which egalitarian
liberals in particular will notice. Dissenters are given no substantial rights
or entitlements to pursue or defend their beliefs or practices. Classical
liberalism argues that they should be offered the freedom to establish or
live within alternative jurisdictions; but not that they should have a ﬁxed
set of entitlements regardless of the jurisdiction. The reason for this here
has much to do with the classical liberal conviction that in the good soci-
ety power or authority is not concentrated but dispersed. For this reason,
alternative regimes or communities would be accepted as capable of exer-
cising authority over their members—even if those communities are them-
selves not liberal in their attitudes.
A useful example is supplied here by the case of Rodney Croome &
Another v. The State of Tasmania, brought before the High Court of
Australia in November 1995. The aim of the plaintiffs in this case was
to reform the Tasmanian Criminal Code, which provided (in sections
122[a] and [c] and 123) that any person who has sexual intercourse with
any person “against the order of nature” or engages in acts of “gross
indecency” be deemed guilty either of unnatural sexual intercourse or
indecent practice between male persons. In their Statement of Claim the
plaintiffs asked the High Court to ﬁnd these sections inconsistent with
the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994, by virtue of being an
arbitrary interference with the right to privacy, and that the Tasmanian
laws were therefore invalid (by virtue of their inconsistency with federal
law, which takes precedence over state law under section 109 of the Aus-
tralian Constitution). The solicitor general for Tasmania submitted that,
because no proceedings had been brought or threatened against the plain-
tiffs in respect of the conduct pleaded in their statement of claim, there
was no “matter” within the meaning of that term in section 76 of the
Constitution (and section 30 of the Judiciary Act 1903 [Cth]) that can
be judicially determined in proceedings between plaintiffs and defendant
and, consequently, that there can be no federal jurisdiction to entertain
the action commenced.
The decision of the High Court on 26 February 1997 to hear the case,
recognizing that the plaintiffs had a legitimate interest in the matter even
though they had not been prosecuted under the laws in question, placed
the Tasmanian government at risk of losing a case fought on the defensi-
bility of the state’s laws on sexual conduct. Yet the importance of the case
was sufﬁciently well recognized that the government of Western Australia
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 23 Oct 2019 06:29:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
68 ✥ Classical Liberalism
announced that it would intervene with a submission in support of the
Tasmanian government’s position. (Its concern was that a successful out-
come for the plaintiffs would provide a precedent for the invalidation of
Western Australia’s own age of consent laws, which discriminated against
homosexuals.) In these circumstances, the Tasmanian government de-
cided to repeal the laws in question, and this was effected on 1May 1998.
This also effectively brought the High Court case to a close.
From a classical liberal point of view, this particular outcome appears
as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the repeal of laws criminalizing
sexual activity between consenting males can only be welcomed, because
the freedom to dissent, not only in word but in deed, is properly upheld.
And the propriety of a state’s sanctioning or promoting particular views
about sexuality is rightly repudiated. On the other hand, the indepen-
dence of a separate jurisdiction—the state of Tasmania—was weakened
insofar as it decided to change its laws in order to avoid having them
declared invalid by a central authority. If classical liberalism is a doctrine
that looks to deal with ethically based disagreement by ensuring that au-
thority on ethical matters is not centralized and concentrated, it must also
view the success of the Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group as a
victory that has come at a troubling price.20 Indeed, it ought to be noted
plainly that there is a certain tension in place here. A classical liberal in
Tasmania would be bound to argue for law reform. But a classical liberal
looking to answer a question about the best institutional arrangements
would want to protect the autonomy or independence of states and pre-
serve a federal structure as one best suited to allowing ethical differences
to coexist.
The signiﬁcance of this tension ought not to be underestimated, for it
reveals that classical liberals can be forced to defend outcomes they dislike
or even ﬁnd repellent on some of their own principles (though it also
displays a distinctive characteristic that marks all liberalisms: a willing-
ness to defend the rights or freedoms of those for whom liberals have
no sympathy). What it does not suggest, however, is any concession to
majoritarianism because the majority view in the state appears to be al-
lowed to trump the right answer. On the contrary, what must be resisted
here, from the classical liberal point of view, is the temptation to use the
greater (majority) power of the federal government to crush the weaker
authority. Tasmania would be wrong to exert its power to uphold major-
ity values and deny homosexuals the right to dissent from majority think-
ing and practice. Australia would equally be wrong to assert its power
over the dissenting authority of Tasmania. In the end it is not majori-
tarianism that must be allowed to trump the right answer; rather, it is
certain principles that must prevail: those political principles which gov-
ern human relations when “the right answer” is in dispute.
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Life-and-Death Decisions
Just as there are differences among ethical traditions over sexuality, so
are there equally profound disagreements among them over matters of
life and death. The importance of these disagreements stems from the
fact that they reﬂect fundamental differences in belief about the nature of
persons, and about what is the nature and source of value. Attitudes to
abortion and infanticide, or to various forms of euthanasia, or to a range
of medical procedures from blood transfusions to organ transplant, or
indeed to the very deﬁnition of death (which can affect the timing of deci-
sions to remove organs from “deceased” donors) reﬂect the diversity of
religious and cultural traditions extant in society. And this diversity of
traditions makes some of these issues peculiarly difﬁcult—if not alto-
gether intractable.
Once again, there are two dimensions to the classical liberal response
to dealing with ethically based conﬂict over such matters. In the ﬁrst in-
stance, in view of its commitment to the coexistence of different ethical
perspectives, classical liberalism sees it as no part of the state’s purpose
to promote or uphold particular ethical views about abortion or euthana-
sia or blood transfusions.21 Within society there are different traditions
with different attitudes to life and death; the purpose of the state is to
make it possible for these to coexist rather than to ensure that one or the
other dominates. The problem (once again), however, is that the modern
state is already implicated in the assessment of some of these questions
inasmuch as it has been a party to the development of laws and institu-
tions that cannot but take positions on these questions. To the extent that
the state is not only a provider of health insurance but a supplier of medi-
cal care, it has to make some decisions about what kinds of treatment it
may—or is morally bound to—offer. Thus, in many societies, the site of
ethical disagreement is government health policy. In this situation, how-
ever, because some particular ethical perspective has to be adopted, those
from dissenting ethical perspectives will have to condone—and maybe
subsidize—ethical practices with which they disagree, or, on occasion,
which they ﬁnd unconscionable.
One part of the classical liberal response to this situation is to recom-
mend that the state not concern itself with matters like health care. It is
not possible to be concerned with such things and not take some stance
on a range of questions that it is no part of the state’s purpose to settle:
questions about what constitutes a good life, or what is required for a
good death. This would not, however, resolve the problem entirely, be-
cause ethical disagreement results not only in resentment on the part of
some that they are forced to be accessories to practices they ﬁnd ethically
dubious, but also in outrage on the part of others that such things are
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condoned anywhere at all. Private abortion clinics are as much targets as
public hospitals.
Given this problem, another part of the classical liberal response to
disagreement is to say that, in the absence of any basis on which ethical
disputes on fundamentals can be settled, ethical priority must be given to
the freedom to dissent from the dominant view. (To put it differently, no
special weight should be given to any ethical stance simply because it is a
majority stance or a position taken by the stronger.) The reality, however,
is that this approach favors those who take particular sides on certain life-
and-death issues. For example, it favors those who wish to see abortion
accepted as a legitimate medical procedure, because the principle of free-
dom to dissent offers no additional support to those who view abortion
as immoral; after all, the pro-abortion (or pro-choice) lobby was never
likely to challenge the freedom of antiabortionists to exercise their own
dissenting choices.
Nonetheless, given that the problem is how to ﬁnd a settlement to ethi-
cally based disagreement, some form of compromise is necessary. Is there
within classical liberalism anything to suggest how compromise ought to
be reached? In political life, compromises will be made along all sorts of
dimensions when disputes can only be settled, not resolved. In the abor-
tion case, compromises are made by restricting the opportunities for ter-
mination without disallowing it altogether—say, by specifying procedures
that have to be followed, disallowing intervention after the second trimes-
ter, andmaking counseling mandatory. Such compromises do not so much
reﬂect any classical liberal commitment as reveal the variety of forms com-
promise might take.
What is, perhaps, more distinctive to classical liberalism, however, is
the suggestion that compromise might be effected by accepting that differ-
ent rules can apply in different places—in different jurisdictions. The pur-
pose of the state is not to establish the truth, or to enforce its implications,
when disputes arise because ethical standpoints differ. Its purpose is sim-
ply to preserve the order in which people can be secure in their freedom.
In such an order, there is no necessity that all people fall under the one
jurisdiction in all matters. States can be—and typically are—made up of
many, often but not always, overlapping jurisdictions; and laws generally
differ from one to another. In a federal republic, for example, political
authority is dispersed among a number of states or provinces; and laws,
including criminal codes, will often vary from one to the next. This is
one form of compromise that has evolved and which classical liberalism
endorses as an important method of addressing and settling moral con-
ﬂict, as well as checking central power.
It ought to be noted, however, that this method is not without its critics,
and liberal critics in particular. The federal solution is what Ronald Dwor-
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kin has described as a “checkerboard” solution.22 And to Dworkin, check-
erboard laws are only acceptable when relatively unimportant matters are
at stake: differences in zoning laws from one place to the next really do
not matter. But not when those matters are matters of principle. It may
seem, he notes, that “we have no reason of justice for rejecting the check-
erboard strategy in advance, and strong reasons of fairness for endorsing
it. Yet our instincts condemn it.”23 So hostile is Dworkin to checkerboard
solutions that he says that, if there existed two alternative solutions, A
and B, such that he thought that A was right in principle and B wrong in
principle, he “would rank the checkerboard solution not intermediate
between the other two but third, below both, and so would many other
people.”24
The reason Dworkin gives for taking this strong position is that he
believes the only way in which we can make sense of “our” political ideals
of justice and fairness is by recognizing another principle that stands di-
rectly in opposition to checkerboard solutions: “integrity.” “Our instincts
about internal compromise suggest another political ideal standing beside
justice and fairness. Integrity. . . . The most natural explanation of why
we oppose checkerboard statutes appeals to that ideal: we say that a state
that adopts these internal compromises is acting in an unprincipled way,
even though no single ofﬁcial who voted for or enforces the compromise
has done anything which, judging his individual actions by the ordinary
standards of personal morality, he ought not to have done.”25 Checker-
board solutions uphold “inconsistency in principle”; and this, integrity
must condemn.26
From a classical liberal point of view, however, Dworkin’s position is
mistaken. There is nothing unprincipled about the kind of compromise
implicit in checkerboard solutions. It only appears unprincipled if one
adopts the starting point Dworkin does: one that claims that “we” need
to work out what “we” think or feel or can in good conscience afﬁrm.
But, Dworkin’s blithe references to “our” instincts nothwithstanding, the
problem is that “we” disagree—and, on occasion, in fundamental ways.
In such a situation, one principled solution is to agree to differ, and to
allow different substantive solutions to prevail in different regions.
Indeed, we should go further and recognize that “integrity” is not the
ideal that should guide our reﬂections if what it points to is an aspiration
to bring about a kind of social unity that is altogether beyond reach in an
ethically plural society. We might be able to agree to differ; but it looks
much less likely that we will ever be able to agree not to differ.
In this respect, one kind of solution to the issue of physician-assisted
suicide that would be endorsed by classical liberalism is one of the sort
that might have arisen in 1995 with the passing in the Northern Territory
of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, permitting assisted suicide under
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prescribed conditions. This act, which came into operation on 1 July
1996, made the Northern Territory the ﬁrst jurisdiction in the world to
permit a doctor to end the life of a terminally ill patient at the patient’s
request. The law survived an attempt at repeal in the Territory Parliament
in August 1996 and a legal challenge in the Northern Territory Supreme
Court, before leave was sought to challenge the act in the High Court of
Australia. In September 1996, however, a Private Member’s Bill designed
to override the act was introduced in the Federal Parliament, and the
passage of the Euthanasia Laws Bill by the Australian Senate on 25March
1997 brought the experiment to an end. In the public and parliamentary
debates surrounding the bill, it became clear that, while the majority of
Australians favored permitting physician-assisted suicide, there were im-
portant (though not unexpected) divisions between different groups. The
Doctors Reform Society and HIV/AIDS support groups favored the
Northern Territory legislation, while the Australian Medical Association,
many Aboriginal groups, and the churches opposed it. From a classical
liberal point of view, however, the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act could
be defended in at least one respect: that there is no reason why all jurisdic-
tions have to conform to a single ethical standard, particularly when the
ethical issue is one over which people are deeply divided.
Ironically, the Northern Territory legislation was overturned precisely
because the classical liberal perspective on this matter was rejected. Had
the legislation been enacted by any state in the Australian federation, the
Commonwealth Parliament would have been powerless to intervene. The
Northern Territory, however, is not a state but a territory; and although
self-governing (with its own parliament and chief minister), it remains
within the control of the Commonwealth. On this occasion, the Common-
wealth chose to exercise its capacity to override—persuaded, perhaps,
that integrity was too important to allow a black square to turn up on
the checkerboard. Perversely, in this instance, the pursuit of integrity al-
lowed a minority viewpoint to triumph, and to close off debate and the
possibility of reform for the foreseeable future. One lesson, at least, that
might be drawn from this episode is that there is little reason to assume
that the pursuit of “integrity” need get us any closer to what “we” think
about anything—let alone about justice.
CITIZENSHIP
A question that obviously arises now is, What are we to make of citizen-
ship in a classical liberal regime? After all, if a doctrine has so little
sympathy with social unity and legal and political integrity, can it really
take citizenship seriously? Moreover, can it sensibly handle disagree-
ments or disputes about the rights and duties of citizenship—disputes
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 23 Oct 2019 06:29:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kukathas ✥ 73
that might include questions about the obligation to undertake national
service, or about the rights of women to take part in or shape fundamen-
tal institutions; or the right (or duty) of the state to educate children for
citizenship?
The truth is that citizenship is not something that classical liberalism
holds in especially high esteem. There are a number of reasons why. One,
which has not been much mentioned thus far, is that as a political doc-
trine classical liberalism is fundamentally an internationalist creed. Be-
cause its interest is fundamentally in individual liberty, it has little com-
mitment to states or nations, which are regarded only as agglomerations
of individuals, or of associations of individuals. While the breakdown of
states may be an evil because of the destruction that may bring, the exis-
tence, survival, or perpetuation of particular states is of no special ethical
signiﬁcance.
Because it takes this attitude, classical liberalism does not place espe-
cial importance on citizenship because it does not see any virtue in build-
ing up institutions that would make for a stronger or deeper form of
social unity. An emphasis on citizenship generally comes out of a concern
to build a political society in which the divisions that mark that society
are overcome. The freedom that is emphasized in such a conception of
the good society is the freedom that comes with the development of a
virtuous citizenry, committed to a shared understanding of the common
good. Citizenship is for republicans and, to some extent, for national-
ists.27 Classical liberals are more likely to favor open borders, or at least
freedom of movement to a degree that might compromise efforts to build
a sense of nationhood.28
For this reason, classical liberalism places more importance on the
capacity or freedom of people to exit or dissent or withdraw from public
institutions than on their duty to participate in them. Thus, for example,
it does not put any emphasis on education for citizenship: it is not
the purpose of education—public or otherwise—to create a virtuous
citizenry that shares particular values or commitments to a national
agenda, or a common understanding of the good of the state, or a shared
view of democratic legitimacy. Every type of regime will produce its own
kind of person(s), to be sure; and classical liberal regimes are no differ-
ent. But however much that may be the case, classical liberalism values
most the importance of freedom to dissent. It is, in a way, at one with
Benjamin Constant in favoring not ancient liberty but modern liberty—
a form of liberty that values freedom from politics as much as freedom
in politics.
In such a regime, then, there would always be opportunity for conscien-
tious objection. In any polity, the state will always pursue its interests;
and it will take what measures it needs to in order to achieve its ends: this
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is a part of the logic of the state. In a classical liberal order, however, there
will be opportunities for individuals or groups to avoid the domination
of the state—to avoid being drawn into its projects. Thus, for example,
it will be possible for individuals to object to national service; or to decline
to be involved in the welfare system (as do the Amish people); or even to
opt for different systems of punishment than that offered by the state.29
In a classical liberal regime, it will be possible to a considerable degree
for people to live untouched by the state, which will take no interest in
their interests, and demand that they take no greater interest in its own
concerns than they wish.
In this regard, the classical liberal view cares less about citizenship and
ensuring that people are brought into the political fold so that they might
be a part of a cohesive whole, than it does about leaving them free to exit
from arrangements they ﬁnd uncongenial, if not altogether intolerable or
unconscionable. The difﬁculties this issue poses are brought out in a par-
ticularly clear way in current discussions of multiculturalism and the poli-
tics of cultural diversity. For someone like Will Kymlicka, who is the most
signiﬁcant thinker today writing on these issues, multiculturalism poses
an important challenge because it appears at odds with the requirements
of citizenship and an obstacle to social unity. If cultural communities, such
as those formed by indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities, may
assert collective rights in virtue of their particular memberships, how can
there be any commitment to citizenship of a modern state?30 His own
solution to this dilemma is to develop a theory of “differentiated citizen-
ship” explaining how, “In a society which recognizes group-differentiated
rights, the members of certain groups are incorporated into the political
community not only as individuals, but also through the group,”31 al-
though he also concedes that, at least to date, liberal (egalitarian) theory
has not been able to explain how social unity can be made consistent with
the other ideals of the democratic multination state.32
From a classical liberal point of view, however, social unity is not so
important except to the extent that it might be necessary for the preserva-
tion of order. And citizenship is not a substantial good or ideal of which
too much can be made. It favors the freedom of people to come and go:
to exit one community and enter another, or to form new associations
altogether. But it takes no especial interest in any particular association,
and attaches no great value to the quality of belonging in any of them.
One consequence of this aspect of the classical liberal outlook is that it
is, in some ways, not very good at handling issues that involve questions
of the quality of citizenship, and the duties of citizens. It does not, for
example, have a theory of education for citizenship. Yet this is a weakness
only to the extent that society and the modern state persist in taking an
interest in matters classical liberals think beyond the scope of political
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authority. The state takes an interest in education because it has an inter-
est in producing citizens who will accept the legitimacy of the state. For
classical liberals the state has no legitimate role in education. That it will
arrogate to itself the power to shape citizens and the citizenry is something
not to be denied, but not either to be applauded.
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26. Ibid.
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27. See, for example, the argument of David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995).
28. Though, to be sure, some liberal egalitarians also advocate open borders.
See Joseph H. Carens, “Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspec-
tive,” in Brian Barry and Robert E.Goodin, eds., Free Movement: Ethical Issues
in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (University Park: Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, 1992), pp. 25–47.
29. A dramatic example of this may be found in the Northern Territory in
Australia, where Aboriginal tribal law has coexisted with territory criminal codes.
On occasion, judges have allowed Aborigines convicted of serious crimes to return
to their communities unpunished so that they might accept the (invariably more
severe) punishments to be meted out by their own peoples—including beatings
and spearings. An account of this is in Paul Sheehan, Among the Barbarians: The
Dividing of Australia (Sydney: Random House, 1998), pp. 8–18.
30. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minor-
ity Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
31. Ibid., p. 174.
32. Ibid., p. 192.
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